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ABSTRACT 
Though much of the literature of experimental psychology 
covers topics that seem relevant to economics, the literature is 
generally ignored by economists. Possibly the reason for this is 
that psychologists seldom use financial incentives to motivate 
subjects' choices. This paper provides an example of an individual 
decisionmaking experiment in which the presence or absence of 
financial incentives affects the subjects' behavior. The observed 
effects are not marginal but of ten involve qualitatively different 
types of responses. 
FINANCIAL INCENTIVE EFFECTS AND INDIVIDUAL DECISIONMAKING 
David M. Grether* 
California Institute of Technology 
Economists have become interested in a number of theoretical 
and policy related areas in which the results depend on fairly specific 
details of individual or group decisionrnaking processes. Consider, 
for example, structure of markets with imperfect information, e.g., 
labor markets (Mortenson 1976, Wilde 1977) and consumer product markets 
(Salop and Stiglitz 1977, and Wilde and Schwartz 1979). In this 
literature it appears that properties of market equilibria depend 
upon the search strategies of economic agents (cf. Salop and Stiglitz 
1977, and Wilde and Schwartz 1979). The effects and desirability 
of intervention in such markets, e.g., truth in lending, labeling type 
laws, or provision of insurance against natural disasters, etc. depends 
upon individuals' decision strategies (cf. Slovic et al. 1977, and 
Schwartz and Wilde 1979). Many important economic decisions are 
made by groups in nonmarket settings, probably the most obvious examples 
being legislative bodies and courts. 
Experimental laboratory methods have been successfully used for 
the evaluation of theories of group decisionmaking. It is well established 
(Fiorina and Plott 1978, and Plott and Smith 1978) that the lack of proper 
incenti ves can l ead to qualitatively differen t outcome choices by 
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committees. Thus, when Grether, Isaac, and Plott (1979, 1981) studied 
the committee procedures used to allocate landing rights at the 
nation's high density airports, all experiments involved substantial 
monetary rewards for successful subjects. 
A substantial body of experimental research on individual 
decisionrnaking under uncertainty exists, most of it the work of 
psychologists (see Grether 1978, Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein 
1977, Hogarth 1975, Slovic and Lichtenstein 1971). It seems safe to 
say that this work is, to a considerable extent, ignored by economists. 
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to explain completely why 
this is so, it is obvious that an important reason is that experimental 
psychologists generally (though not always) do not use financial 
incentives to induce "accurate" judgments by the subjects in the 
experiments. In fact, it is sometimes argued that laboratory data 
generated under proper incentives are no more useful than the results 
based on hypothetical choices (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). The 
failure of incentive effects to show up in decisionrnaking experiments 
(Grether 1980, Grether and Plott 1979) is also noted (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979, and Tversky and Kahneman 1981) as evidence that monetary 
incentives are not needed. 
One cannot claim that financial incentives are never used 
by psychologists, or that when used, they make little difference if 
any. Siegel (1961) reported that increasing the financial incentives 
leads to behavior closer to the optimal strategy in probability learning 
experiments. Also, Slovic (1969), Edwards (1953), and MacCrimmon, 
Stanbury, and Wehrung (1980) demonstrate that individual choice 
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behavior and apparent attitude towards risk are sensitive to the use 
of real money as opposed to hypothetical gambles. See also Slavic, 
Lichtenstein, and Edwards (1965). In some studies, e.g., Lichtenstein 
and Slavic (1973) and Goodman, Saltzman, and Edwards (1979) financial 
incentives are employed, but these studies represent exceptions to 
normal practice. Even when such incentives are employed, there may 
be problems about the precise ways the incentives are structured (for 
elaboration of this point see Grether 1978, Grether and Plott 1979). 
The purpose of this paper is to present evidence that, for 
types of decisions that are frequently considered by psychologists and 
are relevant to economists, modest financial incentives can affect 
individual performance in ways that can have substantial impact upon 
the evaluation of theories concerning individual behavior. That is, the 
behavior of financially unmotivated subjects may be qualitatively 
different from that of subjects whose rewards are dependent upon their 
performance. 
The experiment described in the following section was 
designed to test the representativeness heuristic. For a discussion 
of several decisionmaking heuristics, see Kahneman and Tversky (1972, 
1973, 1979); and Tversky and Kahneman (1971, 1973, 1974, 1981); and 
for the results of the experiment, see Grether (1980). 
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EXPERIMENTAL METHODS 
The experiment was conducted using as subjects students 
from University of California at Los Angeles. Students were recruited 
from economics classes. They were told that an "economics experiment" 
was to be held, given the time and place of the experiment, told that 
the experiment would not last longer than one hour, and that the 
minimum payment would be five dollars. When subjects arrived, they 
were randomly sent to one of two different rooms. Procedures in the 
two rooms were identical except for method of payment. A total of 
ninety-nine people participated in the experiment. 
Instructions were passed out and after obtaining the 
participants' names, social security number�, and addresses, the 
first three paragraphs of the instructions were read out loud to the 
subjects (see Appendix). 
At this time the subjects elected one of themselves to be a 
monitor. The monitor was allowed to tnspect all equipment, and, more 
importantly, to observe all procedures during this experiment. It was 
stated in the instructions that the monitor "should check the truth­
fulness of what the experimenter says, but other than that may not 
communicate any information to you in any way. If the monitor 
communicates any other information, he or she will be asked to leave 
without payment. " 
Though subjects could watch the experiment being prepared, 
it was hoped that the use of the monitor would further increase 
credibility. After the monitor was elected, the remainder of the 
instructions were read and subjects' questions answered. Once it 
s 
appeared that subjects understood what their tasks were, the procedures 
were gone through (i.e., a dry run so to speak) to make sure that the 
subjects fully understood the mechanics of the experiment. 
The equipment consisted of four bingo cages and an opaque 
screen. One of the cages designated Cage X contained balls numbered 
1 through 6, and another cage, Cage Y, contained ba11s numbered l 
through SO. The other two cages (Cage A and Cage B) each contained 
six balls marked with the letters "N" or "G" (four N's and two G's 
in Cage A and three N's and three G's in Cage B) . 
The experiment proceeded as follows: Cages A and B were 
put behind the screen and the rule used to determine which of them 
was to be chosen was announced; Cage X served as the "prior. " The 
rules were of the form "if one of the numbers one through k is drawn 
from Cage X, we shall choose Cage A; otherwise we shall choose Cage B." 
k was varied between two and four, thereby generating prior odds ratios 
for Cage A of one-half, one, and two. Next, a ball was drawn from 
Cage X (the subjects could not see the number on the ball) and, depending 
upon that number, either Cage A or Cage B was chosen and a sample of 
size six was drawn (with replacement) from it. After each draw the 
result ("N" or "G") was announced, written on a blackboard, and the 
subjects also recorded it on forms provided. After the six draws 
were completed, subjects were asked to indicate on their forms "the 
one (cage) you think the balls came from." 
Next subjects were given the opportunity to choose to play 
one of two "bets" called the "Cage Bet" and the "Number Bet." A subject 
won the Cage Bet if the cage the subject picked (A or B) was indeed 
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the cage the balls were drawn from. For the number bet the experimenter 
draws two balls (with replacement) from Cage Y, and if the number on 
the second ball is less than or equal to the number on the first ball, 
the subject wins. Which bet the subject played was determined as 
follows: subjects circled a number from 0 to SO on the form provided. 
If the number circled was less than the first number drawn from Cage Y, 
the subject played the number bet; otherwise the subject played the 
Cage Bet. 
Instructions (see Appendix) contained two examples which 
illustrated the procedures described. Other than these examples and 
the practice run-through, subjects received no traj_ning, nor did they 
receive any further instructions or feedback during the course of the 
experiment. After subjects had chosen the cage and number, the 
procedures were repeated using possibly a different rule for the prior. 
Notice that the procedures are a variant of the method of Gordon 
Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964) for determining demand prices. 
Thus it is a dominant strategy for the subjects to reveal their true 
personal probabilities. In other words, there is no incentive for 
the subjects to lie or otherwise distort their reported probabiliti.es. 
For example, if a subject's subjective probability for Cage A is 
between .6 and .62, the subject should indicate that Cage A is more 
likely and circle the number 30. If a subject's subjective probability 
is exactly .6, the subject should be indifferent between circling 30 
and circling 29. 
Suppose that a subject's subjective probability is .59, but 
that the subject circles a number other than 29. If the number circled 
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is less than 29, then the subject runs the risk of playing the number 
bet with a probability of winning that is less than . 59. Similarly, 
if a subject circles a number greater than 29, say 38, then if numbers 
30 through 38 are drawn, the subject will play the cage bet and miss 
the chance to play the number bet at odds more favorable than . 59/. 41. 
Table 1 gives the posterior probabilities for all possible outcomes 
used and the "correct" number to circle, i.e. , that based upon the 
objective probabilities for each outcome. 
In one room all subjects were paid $7 for participating. 
In the other room subjects were told that at the end of the experiments 
one of their decisions would be randomly selected (using a bingo cage) 
and that those whose decisions were correct, i.e. , those that won the 
relevant bet (Cage Bet or Number Bet) would receive $15, otherwise $5. 
RESULTS 
While preparing the data on subjects' responses, the 
circled numbers were converted into estimates of the subjects' 
personal probabilities. Note that given the procedures subjects 
should never respond by circling numbers 0 through 23 and only those 
subjects whose personal odds on the cage bet are exactly one to one 
could reasonably respond by circling 24. This assumes, of course, 
that subjects would rather win their bets than lose them. 
Some subjects did in fact give such responses and, as can 
be seen from Table 2, the frequency of occurrences was greater for 
those without financial incentives than for those with financial 
incentives. The difference is statistically significant at any 
Prior Probability 
for A 
2/3 
1/2 
l /3 
Prior Probability 
for A 
2 /3 
1/2 
1/ 3 
Prior Probability 
for A 
2/3 
1/2 
1/3 
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TABLE l 
A. POSTERIOR PROBABILITIES OF CAGE A 
Number of N's 
0.149 o. 260 0. 413 0. 584 0.737 0. 849 0. 918 
0. 081 0.149 0. 260 0. 413 0.584 0. 7 3 7  0. 8 4  9 
0. 042 0. 081 0.149 0.260 0. 413 0. 584 0. 7 3 7
B. POSTERIOR ODDS FOR MOST LIKELY ALTERNATJVES 
Number of N's 
0 1 2 3 4 " 
5. 7 0 :  1 2. 85: l 1.42:1 1.40:1 2. 81: 1 s. 62: l 11. 24: 1 
11.39:1 s. 7 0 :  1 2. 85: 1 1.42:1 1.40:1 2. 81:1 5. 62: 1 
22. 7 8:1 11.39:1 5. 7 0 :  1 2. 85: 1 1.42:1 l. 40: 1 2. 81: 1 
c. OBJECTIVE OPTIMAL RESPONSE 
Number of N1 s 
0 1 2 3 4 
42 3 7  29 2 9  36 42 45 
45 42 3 7  2 9  29 36 42 
47 45 42 3 7  29 29 36 
TABLE 2 
RESPONSES FOR SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES 
A. NUMBER OF RESPONSES 
With Financial Incentives 
Without Financial Incentives 
Total 
Clearly in Error 
42 
126 
168 
Others 
918 
854 
1772 
B. NUMBER OF PEOPLE MAKING ERRORS 
With Financial Incentives 
Without Financial Incentives 
Total 
Some Errors 
15 
32 
4 7 
No Errors 
33 
J7 
50 
Total 
960 
980 
1940 
Total 
48 
49 
9 7  
9 10 
conventional level of significance Cx2 (1) = lf4 .1) • Figures 1 and 2 
give the frequency distributions of errors for the two groups. Notice 
that the greater number of mistakes by those not under financial 
incentives for accuracy was not due to just a few people making a 
large number of errors; in fact, nearly twice as many subjects 
made errors in the incentive group as in the group without financial 
incentives. This difference is also highly significant statistically 
2 (X (1) = 11.3). In addition to those responses which are best 
interpreted as errors, some people always (or nearly always) indicated 
that these subjective probabilties were unity. Some people began 
indicating probabilities different from one and after a few trials 
switched and circled 50 for the rest of the experiment. There were 
five subjects with financial incentives and nine subjects without 
who circled 50 nearly all of the time. The result is not statistically 
significant Cx2(1) = 1.2) though it agrees qualitatively with the 
other counts. 
Thus, if one takes the number of people making "nonsense" 
responses or apparently not responding to the different sets of data, 
the overall result is that the rate of such occurrences is much 
higher and statistically significantly so for the group without financial 
incentives. People often make mistakes, so possibly one should not 
be concerned about a single or a very small number of evident errors. 
Those who make several obvious errors are likely to be confused, so 
all their responses are suspect. Thus the total number of questionable 
responses equals the sum of the number of responses of confused 
subjects, the answers of the nonresponsive subjects, and the mistakes 
Frequency 
36[32 
2s l 
24 l
2o l 
16 l 
12 l
sl 
4l 
0 2 
Financial Incentives 
4 6 8 10 12 
Frequency 
3
6
f 
3
2 
28 
14 
FIGURE 1 
24 l 
2ol 
1
6
l 
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8� 
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0 
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l3 
made by other subjects. Where one draws the line between occasional 
and persistent errors is to some extent arbitrary; for example, one 
convention could be that those who 'make five or more clear errors 
(out of twenty responses) are confused overall. Table 3 gives the 
number of responses dropped using this criterion. The effect of 
financial incentives is as expected and statistica� ly significant 
(X
2
(1) = 126.6). Table 3 is only exemplary. Using the data in 
Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2, readers can use their own criteria for 
confused subjects. If one uses individuals dropped rather than 
responses, this naturally decreases the chi-square as each person 
represents roughly twenty responses. Applying this rule for the data 
11nderlying Table 3 gives x2(1) = 5. 0 which is still statistically 
significant. 
It should be noted that "blanks" or nonresponses were 
extremely rare under both conditions. This could possibly be because 
subject,s felt that they might not receive payment for participation 
if these answer forms were not completely filled out. Also, the 
results suggest that restricting the possible responses to the interval 
from one half to one, as is sometimes done (Lichtenstein and Fischhoff 
1977) may affect the apparent quality of the responses. Detailed 
statistical analysis of the responses of the subjects is beyond the 
scope of this paper and will be presented elsewhere. 
TABLE 3 
RESPONSES DROPPED DUE TO ERROR, CONFUSION, OR NONRESPONSIVENESS 
With Financial Incentives 
Without Financial Incentives 
Total 
Dropped 
167 
398 
565 
Not Dropped 
793 
582 
1375 
14 
Total 
960 
980 
1940 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper some evidence of the effects of financial 
incentives in decisionmaking experiments has been presented. Note 
that the behavioral effects noted are not of the "fine tuning" type 
(i.e., is the mean response for Group A significantly different from 
that of Group B?), but refer to gross aspects of behavior, namely, 
the rates of occurrence of clearly confused or strange responses 
and of nonresponsiveness. 
The behavior differences observed here are not merely 
increased variability that could be compensated for by taking 
larger samples. Rather, the behavior observed is qualitatively 
different. This finding is consistent with the findings of Fiorina 
and Plott (1978) in their study of majority rule committees. It 
appears that proper incentives are useful not merely to make 
economists pay attention to the experimental results, but also to 
insure cooperation and attentiveness on the part of the individual 
subjects. Thus, for those questions of public policy and for 
problems of theory testing for which experimental methods are necessary 
or appropriate, the use of proper financial incentives can be of 
critical importance. 
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